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Enterprise Models and 




The EU is leading the world with its roadmap for companies – the Sustainable Industry as part 
of the Green Deal, the EU Climate Target plan for 2030 and the New EU Industrial Strategy. At 
the same time, in pursuit of these crucial objectives, the Union is heavily dependent on the 
contribution of the private sector.  
The question is whether companies are equipped to follow this path and take on the associated 
responsibilities. Hurdles that so far received little attention now present themselves in the 
realm of governance and management, organisation structure and culture as the major 
determinants of corporate behaviour.  
This paper argues that the dominant enterprise models, the shareholder model and the 
stakeholder model, both serve as barriers to the shift from growth-oriented to sustainable, 
resilience-oriented capitalism. It stresses the need for alternative models and sketches the 
contours of a new competitive enterprise model that is firmly rooted in values continental 
Europeans share. It will be called the EU Model. Finally, it proposes an EU agenda for a level 
playing field, because competition between models should be encouraged.  
The day has come for politicians and policymakers to no longer limit themselves to 
rubberstamping corporate governance codes. They must actively engage in discussions about 
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Enterprise is the workhorse of the modern economy. It is by far the most important source of 
economic value; societies use enterprise to pursue social and political objectives. Economic 
value is created by improving the productivity of existing businesses, by expanding them and 
by building new businesses around new products. The cast-iron law of business economics is 
that products and services must be sold at a margin that is large enough to cover all fixed and 
variable costs, including the real costs (interest rates and dividends) of the capital that is 
required to sustain the company and to invest. These real costs are of course dependent on 
the risk perceived by the providers of capital and are determined by capital markets. A surplus 
is called the free cash flow. Value creation is defined as an increase in the free cash flow.  
No escape, here, for the many critics and opponents of capitalism. Capital has a cost that needs 
to be absorbed by enterprises, just like the costs of materials, services, and labour. That said, 
many proponents of unfettered capitalism have found ways to keep the cost of capital 
artificially high, which is also undermining capitalism.  
By implication, enterprise is also the workhorse of the EU’s Green Deal, the Digital Economy, 
and the Industrial Strategy. Put simply: enterprise must change course by phasing out products 
that undermine the EU’s objectives in these three fields. At the same time, enterprise must 
mobilise its capacity to innovate and create new products that befit the new economy. All this 
requires unprecedented levels of investment under uniquely uncertain circumstances. The risks 
have never been greater. Yet if enterprise fails the EU will fail. It is inconceivable that a 
turnaround will be achieved without the commitment and leadership provided by enterprise 
boards and without the stock of intellectual property, know-how, organisational skills and 
financial resources built by enterprises over decades.  
Unfortunately, the starting point leaves a lot to be desired. Where enterprise still enjoys the 
reputation for decisiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency, particularly with civil servants and 
politicians, it has failed the economy significantly over the past decade. Under extreme benign 
economic and political circumstances investment growth and productivity growth were 
inexplicably low, innovation was unevenly distributed, and hidden and registered 
unemployment, despite progress, was stubbornly 
high.  
There is every reason to explore the extent to 
which the key features of enterprise have 
contributed to this poor performance. These are: 
the position of enterprise in the social economy, 
governance and management, corporate 
organisation, and corporate culture. And going 
forward: the extent to which these features help 
or hinder the demands of the Green Deal, the Digital Economy, and the new Industrial Strategy. 
The present Covid-19 and ensuing economic crises heighten the urgency of fundamental 
change.   
There is every reason to explore the 
extent to which the key features of 
enterprise have contributed to this poor 
performance. These are: the position of 
enterprise in the social economy, 
governance and management, corporate 
organisation, and corporate culture. 
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Two enterprise models dominate the scene, the so-called shareholder model and the 
stakeholder model. In the following two sections we will show that the basic features of these 
models double as fundamental flaws. No apologies are offered for lack of nuance. The objective 
of the exercise is to draw the clearest possible distinction with the EU model.   
2. The shareholder enterprise model 
At face value, the shareholder or Anglo-Saxon enterprise model appears to be a highly 
appealing way to conduct business. The underlying rationale is clear: shareholders are the 
modern incarnation of the entrepreneur; because they put their money at risk it is considered 
morally just and economically wise to place the pursuit of shareholders’ interests at the 
forefront of corporate rules and practices. This means that the return on equity (ROE) becomes 
the overriding corporate objective. The underlying (wrong) assumption is that forever-rising 
profits per share are crucial to a higher stock price and shareholder return. This assumption 
creates several impediments to radical change in support of the EU objectives.  
First, all things being equal, the push to optimise profits per share acts as a drag on investment. 
Bookkeeping conventions dictate that R&D and start-up expenses are not investments but costs 
and reduce reported profits. Where expansion of capacity is inescapable, acquiring a 
competitor is more attractive because acquisitions accounted for on the balance sheet do not 
burden the profit and loss account in the short run as they can be amortised over many years. 
As most acquisitions do not produce the intended benefits, much economic value is destroyed 
(Schilling, 2018). Furthermore, the key role of the profit per share underpins the extensive stock 
buyback programmes, Lowering the denominator of a ratio, profit per share, pushes the value 
up, which is an expensive hobby given the exploding stock markets. Share buy-backs do not add 
any economic value and have negative consequence for the solvency of the company.  
Second, the safest way to increase profit in the 
shortest possible time is cost-cutting – often 
synonymous with manpower reduction. This practice 
can however break up valuable internal, external, 
commercial, and operational networks and destroy 
intellectual property in the broadest sense of the 
word, including tacit knowledge embedded in the 
company, for example. Cost-cutting is now a permanent feature of corporate life and both a 
disincentive for the company to invest in their employees and a disincentive for employees to 
invest in their jobs. 
Another policy that flows from the emphasis on profitability is the defence of margins on 
existing products. This contributes more to profits and is far less risky than introducing new 
products, which takes time and resources and exposes the company to new competitors. 
Lobbying regulators to maintain barriers to new entrants is a time-tested approach. Mergers 
Cost-cutting is now a permanent 
feature of corporate life and both a 
disincentive for the company to invest 
in their employees and a disincentive 
for employees to invest in their jobs. 
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and takeovers also help because they create cost-cutting opportunities and strengthen market 
positions.   
The popularity of all these policies is greatly enhanced by the way management is rewarded. 
Up to 80% of their considerable remuneration package is variable. Managers act perfectly 
rationally by curtailing innovation and by postponing or reducing investment. As a result of 
those few simple mechanisms the enterprise is hollowed out and robbed of its capacity to take 
risks, which is the hallmark of entrepreneurship. A short-term orientation is not a perspective 
or an attitude but a function of the chosen enterprise model. 
Third, very typical for the shareholder model is the emphasis on personal leadership. 
Shareholders believe that only individuals can guarantee consistency in corporate policies; that 
only individuals can inspire the rank and file and that only individuals can be held accountable. 
This helps to explain why in almost half of the 
companies, particularly US-headquartered ones, 
the chairperson and CEO roles are filled by one 
single person. It also explains why managers 
throughout the enterprise are supposed to 
exercise full control over their subordinates and 
be fully accountable for the performance of their 
units even as, in most cases, markets, competitors 
and regulators determine outcomes.  
The enterprise is fully exposed to all the biases and stereotypes of the leader, and to his or her 
overconfidence in their capacity to process information, to predict the future and to pass 
judgement on colleagues, partners, and customers.  
Endowing the CEO with such power has three other major disadvantages. Each new CEO feels 
entitled and is granted the opportunity to build their own team, replacing anywhere between 
20% and 80% of the top management. All this to be assured of a loyal following. Is it also 
considered self-evident that the new CEO may break up whatever his or her predecessor has 
wrought and that s/he is even supposed to put her personal stamp on the company. Most new 
CEOs negotiate very considerable write-offs, justified or not, to start with a clean sheet. The 
continuity that is required to implement green targets, to invest in ICT and to restructure the 
company suffers as a result. Third, non-performing CEOs are very difficult to dislodge; precious 
time is lost when urgent action is required. 
Fourth, the need to meet the profit per share target communicated to the markets and the 
perceived need for tight managerial controls puts maximum emphasis on quantitative financial 
and operational indicators and targets. This is a considerable and costly distortion of reality, as 
if the pursuit of qualitative objectives cannot contribute to value creation.  
Sticks and carrots are introduced for each division and business unit down to the individual 
employee. This provides strong incentives to negotiate reachable targets (so-called key 
performance indicators, or KPIs) with the next higher echelon at the expense of other units. It 
The enterprise is fully exposed to all the 
biases and stereotypes of the leader, 
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capacity to process information, to 
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4 | DONALD KALFF 
 
also creates fierce competition for resources to meet the targets. In the name of rationality, 
internal competition for investment budgets, talent and other resources is encouraged. Risk is 
toxic and needs to be transferred to colleagues and partners. All this results in low-trust 
organisations, which is far from helpful as the availability of inspired individuals and fruitful, 
proactive cooperation is needed now more than ever. Such companies are poorly equipped to 
engage with government agencies and small and medium sized commercial partners. They are 
totally incapable of dealing with micro companies. These are key requirements as cooperation 
is fundamental to the Green Deal, the Digital Economy and the Industry Strategy. 
All this in line with astute observers pointing to the fact that companies that are guided or 
bound by shareholder interest are not in the best position to contribute to long-term challenges 
such as those posed by global warming (Dahlberg and Wiklund 2018). 
As observed, inter alia by Robert Anderson IV (2016), the law of corporate governance is 
“heading for a showdown” after, in recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has argued 
that “short-term investors, especially short-term activist institutional investors, wield too much 
influence over corporate governance”. The core theme of these articles is that there is a “stark 
difference” between the interests of short-term and long-term investors:  
“[s]hort-term shareholders prefer managers to maximize short-run share price, 
while long-term shareholders prefer to forego immediate gains in favor of 
maximizing long-run shareholder value.” (Hazen 1991). 
This is even truer of institutional investors. As Kahan and Rock (2007) put it, short-termism 
“presents the potentially most important, most controversial, most ambiguous, and most 
complex problem associated with hedge fund activism”, giving rise to the related accusation 
that hedge funds induce managerial short-termism.  
The issue is reportedly worsened by the existence of legal provisions and corporate policies, 
especially in the US, which tilt the balance towards short-term shareholders. They include: 
dividends and share repurchases, motivated by institutions’ desire to increase ‘short-term 
earnings’ by cutting research and development; and the combination of leverage returning cash 
to shareholders. Karmel (2004) observes that during the 1980s,  
“the pressure for high overall return by institutional investors in U.S. corporations 
resulted in an unhealthy leveraging of U.S. corporations to meet that demand. 
Funds were borrowed to pay dividends to shareholders, in the form of ordinary 
cash distributions, share repurchases, or takeover premiums” (Anabtawi 2006).  
Grossman (2010) further argues that myopic markets end up penalising managers for long-
term investment, pressuring them to govern for short-term objectives. 
In summary, the favoured policies of listed companies destroy economic value in the name of 
the shareholder. The shareholder model does not serve the economy and does serve not a 
society that is facing extraordinary challenges.  
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3. The stakeholder enterprise model 
Like the shareholder model, the stakeholder model has considerable, albeit superficial appeal. 
Who would be against the appropriate protection of shareholders and employees? And who 
wouldn’t, given their legitimate interests, be in favour of the fair treatment of suppliers and 
customers? Intuitively, companies that feel a 
responsibility to the communities in which they 
operate deserve support. However, the 
fundamental flaw of the model is that 
companies operate in a forcefield of demands 
expressed by a variety of professionalised 
interest groups that seek to change the 
company, without accepting accountability for 
the unintended consequences and the hidden 
costs that come with the fulfilment of their 
demands. Stakeholders manifest themselves by exercising veto power over corporate policies 
and so act as a drag on corporate decision making. Most of them lack the expertise or are not 
interested in developing and discussing viable alternatives.  
Companies that have embraced the stakeholder model are vulnerable in that they must engage 
interest groups with or without legitimate claims. They must cope with the many interrelated 
issues and continuously shifting coalitions around these issues. All too often, companies find 
themselves in untenable positions when stakeholders present contradictory demands. 
Stakeholders such as trade unions, professional associations, regional and local governments, 
and special interest groups seek to institutionalise their position to strengthen their bargaining 
power. At the same time, stakeholders feel compelled to cause occasional disruption to 
augment the credibility of their threats during future negotiations. They also need to serve their 
base. The professional staff of stakeholder offices also have interests to defend – employment 
being the most obvious one, which muddies the water.  
Many stakeholders have different channels to make themselves heard. Trade unions, for 
example, negotiate collective labour agreements, are represented in works councils and are in 
a position to put pressure on governments and regulators to conduct inquiries, introduce new 
legislation, and take corrective measures. They also make inroads into the company by 
nurturing contacts with senior managers; for example, the human resource department often 
acts as informal internal lobbyist for trade unions.  
In academia, stakeholder theory has also been criticised for being somewhat nebulous, to such 
an extent that it eventually leaves corporate managers with no clear objective or the possibility 
to act strategically in their self-interest (Miles, 2017; Sternberg 2004; Jensen, 2002). Other 
scholars (Key 1999) have stated that it does not properly link different actors of the firm, nor 
does it link internalities and externalities. Also, Brandt and Georgiou (2018) observe that 
considering the interests of multiple stakeholders does not equate to being socially (let alone 
The fundamental flaw of the model is that 
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environmentally) responsible. On the one hand, broad social concerns and stakeholder 
considerations are not necessarily the same, and indeed stakeholder theory is not an 
underlying concept of Corporate Social Responsibility. On the other hand, when it comes to 
long-term social and environmental sustainability, it must be recalled that the relevant 
stakeholders (future generations) are often unable to make their voices heard within the 
boundaries of the corporation.       
In a nutshell, stakeholder corporations often find themselves drowning in endless quests for 
consensus-building and incur substantial transaction costs. In all this, future stakeholders are 
conspicuously absent. Adding insult to injury, their absence helps management prevent or solve 
conflicts with established stakeholders by postponing the timely tackling of threats and by 
shifting the absorption of costs to a later moment, preferably beyond their tenure. This brings 
in a form of ‘collective’ short-termism, as opposed to the individual short-termism triggered by 
the Anglo-Saxon model. Many stakeholders, claiming to act in the best interest of the company, 
are enabled by the feeble resistance of many corporate directors. Overburdened managers 
who on a single day must juggle many dossiers are no match for rested, focused negotiators 
who know their single dossier inside out. The standard push-back by directors who are focused 
on the need for profitability is inadequate, as it inevitably leads to an unwinnable debate about 
the right level of shareholder return on investment. The need to keep access to stock markets 
over time is too abstract, even if it were true. The obligation on the part of the company to 
generate enough economic value to pay for all expenses, to invest and to cover the real cost of 
capital constitute a far more solid ground for discussions with stakeholders (see the paragraph 
on the EU Enterprise Model).  
The negative consequences for innovation, productivity and growth of the company are, as in 
the case of the shareholder model, profound.  
There is more. Thinking in terms of interests does not stop at the corporate boundary. The 
stakeholder model allows divisions and large business units to define and defend their own 
interests. Established organisations are inherently conservative, as any technical and 
organisational disruption implies a challenge to the often-delicate balance of power. A board is 
well advised to obtain the support of divisions and business unit management for significant 
proposals. Board proposals that seriously undermine a division’s position of power are 
guaranteed to trigger conflict. Proposals are often amended to accommodate divisions in the 
mistaken belief that such concessions will smooth implementation. The original intentions of 
the proposal get compromised and potential value is not realised.  
The position of power of various divisions is to a large degree dependent on their contribution 
to overall corporate profitability. This in turn often depends on a limited number of large 
customers that have integrated the corporate products into their offering to their customers 
and are therefore interested in improving quality and/or a lower price, not in innovation.  
Competition among the divisions is part and parcel of corporate life. Whereas innovation 
requires permeable organisation boundaries many initiatives are short lived. For all these 
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reasons, the stakeholder model deserves its reputation for slow, inconclusive decision making 
and the avoidance of risk.  
Lack of innovation, and a brake on investment as the result of slow, basically political, decision-
making causes misalignment with the long-term needs of pro-innovation, pro-sustainability 
corporate conduct in support of the EU priorities. 
4. An alternative: towards an EU Enterprise Model  
The most advanced European companies have moved beyond the standard models described 
in the previous sections. Companies like Novo Nordisk, Statoil and Svenska Handelsbanken 
position themselves differently, are supervised and managed differently and nurture a very 
different culture. They also easily outshine their Anglo-Saxon competitors GSK, BP, and Barclays 
in terms of value creation, profitability and stock market valuations. There is of course no way 
that financial markets will loosen their grip on listed European companies which, with very few 
exceptions, have embraced the shareholder model. There are also many companies that 
depend on venture capital, which also leaves very little wiggle room to deviate from the pursuit 
of return to shareholders.  
There is still a large contingent of European companies that have a choice, however. Companies 
that consider a stock market listing should be forewarned: this includes established private 
companies, but also fast-growing SMEs. The tide seems to have turned, as the number of listed 
companies comes down, the cost of a listing goes up and public awareness of corporate 
cynicism increases. Banking scandals have become part of life, large pharmaceutical companies 
come increasingly under fire for their pricing policies and the aura surrounding technological 
giants is gone. In the ‘trust game’ there is a need for more responsible business conduct, and 
the legal system should provide adequate incentives to this end. As it happens, legislation, 
including the civic codes of all EU countries, 
except for Ireland, are rooted in Roman and 
Germanic law. Economic life is based on the 
obligation to act in good faith and to adhere to 
the principles of fairness and reasonableness. 
Pushed to the sidelines by Anglo- Saxon 
companies, and Anglo-Saxon law firms, these 
legal fundamentals are still in place to guide the 
building of alternative enterprise models.  
What we define here as the EU Model is a framework companies can use to position themselves 
and to design their organisations depending on their societal role, the technologies they 
employ and the markets they serve. Applying the law of the requisite variety is the only 
available structural response to the unprecedented uncertainty economies face. A new field of 
competition is introduced, this time based on the chosen corporate objectives and the way and 
means to pursue them.  
Applying the law of the requisite variety is 
the only available structural response to 
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means to pursue them. 
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This flexibility is the essence of the modern company and the model is therefore fundamentally 
different from the models discussed in the previous sections. It is far more resilient, and has 
distinct advantages in pursuing the EU objectives. Here are its key features.  
Companies are aware of the need for a licence to operate to be granted by society at large, in 
many important arenas, represented by the EU. Whereas nowadays all corporate mission 
statements contain lofty promises to contribute to societal needs, these are non-binding, and 
in practice are very difficult to operationalise. There is simply no place for them in the 
shareholder model as this would require a total overhaul of a control system based on financial 
targets for divisions, business units and staff. The stakeholder model produces more and more 
key performance indicators, which paralyses decision making.  
Corporate objectives and their corporate contributions to society must be taken up in the 
corporate articles of association guiding management and the organisation alike (Kalff, 2009)1. 
The articles provide a solid base on which to hold management accountable and are the place 
to anchor the good faith obligation and fairness and reasonableness in dealing with employees 
and business partners. Similarly, the principles of good governance, such as the principle of 
prudence, respect for existing policies, sanctions based on convincing proof and the avoidance 
of conflict of interest are fundamental to what is in essence the constitution of the enterprise.  
Crucially, the articles of association serve communication with the providers of capital and help 
the growing numbers of investors that are pouring ever-increasing sums into companies that 
take value creation for society seriously, 
but have difficulty distinguishing the 
chaff from the wheat. They also guide 
the selection of board members and 
management and inform human 
resource policies.    
Having anchored a broad set of 
objectives, companies have every 
incentive to make the largest contribution to EU objectives at the lowest possible cost, 
capitalising on their distinct competences and resources. The sum of specific contributions by 
unique companies will outweigh the imposition of general standards. 
The EU model draws heavily on the way many family companies are positioned and managed. 
Family companies tend to put the interest of the company centre stage, not its finance 
performance or its stakeholders. As a result, they are often both more profitable and better 
citizens than their listed counterparts.   
 
1 The proposal to use the articles of association to broaden the corporate objectives was launched by Donald Kalff 
in Modern Kapitalisme, alternatieve grondslagen voor grote ondernemingen (2009) pp 83-85, Uitgeverij Business 
Contact (ISBN 9789047002086 2009).  
The sum of specific contributions by unique 
companies will outweigh the imposition of general 
standards. The enterprise is already a contract 
partner with a legal status, but it is also a working 
community and an indispensable institution  
to help change society. 
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The enterprise is already a contract partner with a legal status, but it is also a working 
community and an indispensable institution to help change society.    
However, none of this has any meaning unless the company creates economic value on a 
structural basis. It is a misunderstanding that profits are 
essential for corporate continuity. Economic value 
creation, the creation of a cash surplus and a solid 
balance sheet, are essential, however.  
A major push to introduce EVA (Economic Value Added) reporting to replace the reporting of 
profits and losses has failed but the methods are still part of the toolkit of finance managers. 
As underlined, EVA is the only sound basis for the analysis of the financial consequences of 
investment and other options open to the company.  
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the difference over time between all forms of income 
and all kinds of expenditure should exceed the cost of capital, dividends, and interest payments. 
The aim is to generate free cash flow for future investment and to strengthen the balance sheet 
of the company. Only a strong balance sheet can guarantee that companies can capture 
projected cash flows now and in the distant future. A strong balance sheet is also required to 
take on the risks inherent in investing in the New Economy.  
The focus on long-term future cashflows improves the sensitivity of managers and staff 
throughout the company to anticipating the impact of the EU objectives and programmes, 
thereby increasing the time to make necessary structural adjustments.   
Furthermore, the emphasis on the creation of economic value helps to identify five different 
sources of economic value, each to be supported by specialised managers and staff and by 
tailor-made and very different forms of decision making. This is key to improving productivity, 
the only basis for economic growth. This outline is also an implicit contribution to the stagnating 
debate about the causes of the spectacular decline in productivity growth since 2008. Scholars 
should have paid more attention to the lack of value creation flowing from the flaws of the 
share- or stakeholder models.   
An underestimated source of value creation is reducing value destruction. Each company is 
subject to market gyrations, each company must cope with internal and external disturbances 
to its standard procedures, each company is confronted with the operational mistakes of its 
supervisors, employees and partners. It is an unglamorous and demanding task to impose 
discipline and it requires profound knowledge of the corporate systems to find creative 
solutions at very short notice. It amounts to defending the integrity of the system, the results 
of which are recorded nowhere but contribute directly to the free flow of cash.  
The second source of value creation is the so-called multifactor productivity improvement; in 
short, the increase in economic value that cannot be attributed to investment. Going forward, 
skilled planners allocate available assets, expertise, and manpower to the best of their ability. 
In practice companies do better by an amalgam of new ideas, minor adjustments of procedures 
... none of this has any meaning 
unless the company creates 
economic value on a structural basis. 
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and information flows, and new forms of cooperation. In a healthy company many informal, 
small experiments are conducted, many of which fail, but many succeed.  
Both sources of value creation are stimulated by the management of the business unit, the 
kernel of the company, generally a so-called product market combination or a production unit. 
It is all about the realisation of the potential of the unit, its underlying business model and the 
best possible use of manpower and assets.  
The third source of value creation is investment, in the broadest sense of the word. Investing 
in plant, equipment, ICT, training, and organisation for each individual business unit with a 
distinct, well-defined, and viable business model. All this with the aim to bring the potential to 
generate economic value by the business units to a structurally higher level. Business unit 
managers may advise but cannot be part of the decision making. They are conflicted as they 
are paid to believe in their business models and stand to benefit personally from investments.  
It falls to the management of the corporation to conceive, develop, decide upon and implement 
investments. Their responsibility for implementation will significantly improve the decision-
making process. Only those familiar with all the considerations and assumptions that went into 
the decision can make the inevitable adjustments to changing circumstances. It also falls to 
corporate management to realise the potential of business unit cooperation and to provide 
good quality services to the business units at the lowest possible cost.  
The fourth way to create value is to optimise the portfolio of business models taken up by 
business units that at any point populate the company. Business units that destroy value and 
cannot be turned around need to be dismantled. New business units that can create value need 
to be set up.  
For that latter purpose, companies fall back on a portfolio of so-called real options to create 
new businesses. The building, maintenance, and the enrichment of this portfolio of 
opportunities is the fifth way to create economic value. This is the world of R&D, product 
development and the identification of possible partners.   
Managing the portfolio of present and future business models is an entrepreneurial function. 
EU Model entrepreneurship is, like in family companies, brought back to where it belongs: to 
board level. Here, corporate management is conflicted as they are biased to seek expansion of 
the company and bolster their careers.  
The board is also responsible for the corporate management development programme and 
appoints both corporate and business unit managers.   
It is already established practice that boards take responsibility for the financing of the 
company at the lowest possible costs. When central banks keep real interest rates at around 
0%, the conclusion must be that the cost of capital is kept artificially high. Calculating the cost 
of capital based on past stock price volatility helps the providers of capital, basing the cost of 
capital on historic high rates of return is easy. Fuelling narratives that inflate the riskiness of a 
sector to justify a high price of capital is common practice.  
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There is every reason to base investment decisions on the actual cost of capital incurred to 
finance specific projects. This should unleash substantial investment programmes as the net 
present value of proposed projects goes up.   
A final task of the board is to act as the custodian of the corporate articles of association and 
the defender of the principles enshrined in it.  
Separating out the different ways to create value does justice to the major differences in 
decision making. The preparation, the actual decision, implementation and evaluation in each 
domain should be tailor made and requires different skills. An important additional advantage 
is that each member of the organisation is offered a line of sight to the corporate objectives 
while being aware of the need to create economic value. This is the basis for the proposed far-
reaching delegation of responsibility and accountability, which in turn is essential for rapid 
adjustment to favourable and unfavourable developments. It also prevents harm being done in 
hierarchical organisations when senior management intervenes at, what is seen as, lower 
organisational levels.  
This dispersed leadership and interdependence is not unlike the unique mandates of national, 
provincial, and local governments. This type of organisation can only be managed based on 
principles, not rules, targets or other forms of 
prescription.  
Companies that are guided by good faith, 
reasonableness and fairness, both internally 
and in dealings with suppliers, customers, and 
partners can built the trust that is required for 
cooperation and, to state the obvious, 
cooperation is a necessary condition to 
creating and managing the risky ventures in 
support of the Green Deal and Digital Europe.   
Such an approach would also usher in a new period of labour relations. The negative impact of 
the 19th century opposition between capital and labour can finally be brought under control. 
The enterprise is not serving shareholders, its employees, and other stakeholders, it is exactly 
the other way around. Shareholders need the enterprise to receive a return on their 
investment, employees depend on the enterprise for their income and fulfilment; society at 
large cannot function without enterprise. It follows that the interest of the enterprise trumps 
any other interest, a principle found in civic codes in many countries that deserves to be part 
of the corporate articles of association. This opens the possibility for new forms of co- 
determination. Where present work councils can never provide sufficient counterweight to 
management in evaluating large and highly complicated investment proposals, let alone 
restructuring programmes, a new representative employee body, without stakeholder 
representation, could play a significant role in nominating and appointing members of the 
board and holding the board accountable as a custodian of the articles of association.    
Companies that are guided by good faith, 
reasonableness and fairness, both internally 
and in dealings with suppliers, customers, and 
partners can built the trust that is required 
for cooperation and, to state the obvious, 
cooperation is a necessary condition to 
creating and managing the risky ventures in 
support of the Green Deal and Digital Europe. 
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Key to the suitability of the European Enterprise Model serving the EU priorities is the 
confluence of on the one hand investment and productivity improvement and on the other 
environmental and digital benefits. Each new generation of plant and equipment is more 
efficient, more environmentally friendly, and more digitally advanced. As a result, the 
investment in the New Economy is to a significant degree financed by the productivity 
improvement realised by the contributing companies.  The EU Enterprise Model has distinct 
advantages in financing a company. The focus on free cash flow will help to finance investment 
and reduce dependence on equity and loans. With respect to equity, the role of the articles of 
association, as the constitution of the company, was mentioned to help build a following of 
loyal shareholders. Loans are easier to obtain as banks look at cash flows and solvency to 
evaluate their risks. Finally, consistently rising productivity puts companies in a strong position 
to obtain capital at lower than market prices.   
Where does the discussion on European Enterprise Models stand? Schroeter (2007) recalls the 
words of famous American economist Charles Kindleberger, who observed that “If European 
integration is to be really achieved, there must be European corporations”. In his investigation, 
Schroeter finds evidence of distinctive traits of a European enterprise, despite the ongoing 
contamination by the American model, characterised by more evident organisational patterns 
such as the multi-divisional structure (so-called M-Form). Still today, large mergers such as 
Bayer/Monsanto pose challenges, namely in how to reconcile shareholder capitalism with more 
European ways of organising and conceiving of business conduct and structure. Gordon (1999), 
Owen (2016) and Cassis, Colli and Shroeter (2016) have shed light on the transformation and 
contamination of European capitalism by the advent of what seems to be more risk-oriented 
forms of capitalism from across the Atlantic.  
Again, the push towards a European enterprise model may be further nurtured by Brexit, since 
the British corporate governance model has traditionally remained closer to the American one 
than the continental European model (Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann 2003). Williams and 
Conley (2005) spoke of a “third way” to capitalism more than a decade ago, emphasising how 
the European model had already made progress towards enhanced corporate social and 
environmental responsibility of firms.  
However, the spin-off in the form of increased emphasis on corporate social responsibility is a 
distraction. The middle-ranking officials in charge of such programmes are conspicuously 
absent in the boardrooms where decisions are being taken about remuneration, dividends and 
share buybacks, board appointments, budgets including the investment budget, and mergers 
and acquisitions.  
The same holds for the recent outburst of self-flagellation by American CEOs who have 
suddenly discovered that their companies have other interests to pursue in addition to the 
interests of their shareholders. These CEOs lack any concept of how to apply these new insights 
in practice. A considerable pushback by investors explains the lack of any progress in this 
setting.  
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Whereas both the shareholder and the stakeholder model at least show some internal 
consistency, hybrid models such as that enshrined in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code 
and approved by the Dutch Government will destroy even more value. 
5. An agenda for the Commission 
The Commission can do much to prepare the ground for the development of an EU Enterprise 
Model and can stimulate its use.  
The single-most important contribution would be the integration of the EU’s financial markets. 
This would reduce both the position of stock markets and the role of private equity. Only then 
can the depth and variety of providers of capital and their expanding range of objectives be 
matched with the variety of objectives pursued by companies.  
In addition, the EU Model and other European enterprise models are not fully represented in 
the current EU corporate legal model, even though a vibrant debate has emerged since the late 
1990s among academics and other stakeholders, such as trade unions, about the need to 
rebalance shareholder capitalism with more stakeholder representation and a more diffuse 
model of governance. For example, the Davignon Working Group in 1997 argued that “workers 
must be closely and permanently involved in decision-making at all levels of the company and 
pave the way for the creation of the European Company Statute, or societas europaea (SE). Yet 
corporate governance was firmly put on the European regulatory agenda only a couple of years 
later, with the Financial Services Action Plan of 1999. A decade later, during the financial crisis, 
the de Larosière report commissioned by the European Commission concluded that corporate 
governance constituted “one of the most important failures of the present crisis”. But little if 
anything has been tried since then to effectively reform the corporate governance model in 
Europe, let alone tailor it to SMEs, which constitute the overwhelming majority (more than 
98%) of European businesses.  
Horn (2011) sees a clear pattern in which the importance of workers in European enterprises, 
emphasised since the Green Paper on Employee Participation and Company Structure of 1975, 
has gradually been replaced by an almost exclusive emphasis on market efficiency. For 
example, she cites the then-Commissioner for the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein, who 
claimed that the objective of regulation was merely “to set up a framework which then enables 
the markets to play their disciplining role in an efficient way” (Bolkestein, 2003). She further 
argues that during the 1980s and 1990s, “rather than advocating a ‘positive’ harmonization 
approach, the Commission’s approach has become increasingly based on identifying and 
subsequently eliminating obstacles to the free movement of companies and capital. Whereas 
corporate control used to be very much located in the domain of company law, subject to 
‘positive’ harmonization, it has become increasingly regulated under aspects of capital and 
financial markets law”. The long, tortuous iter of the EU Takeover Directive was a prime 
example of this shift, with the result that places decisions related to the company in the event 
of a takeover exclusively in the hands of shareholders. Later, the 2003 Company Law Action 
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Plan and key decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU contributed to this shift towards the 
‘marketisation’ of European corporate governance.  
After Brexit, work can start on a new SE truly based 
on European values, including arrangements on co-
determination that had to be kept separate at the 
insistence of the UK. At the same time, there is now 
an opportunity to design an SE tailor-made for SMEs. 
In addition to the contribution an SE makes to cross-
border arrangements it provides companies 
flexibility in their positioning and in designing their 
corporate governance – the hallmark of companies 
that embrace the EU Enterprise Model.   
The third contribution the Commission could make would be to increase diversity in 
management education. Virtually all busines schools teach the shareholder model doctrines. 
Business schools focus on meeting the demands of listed companies, private equity firms and 
consultants for well-trained, hardworking, competitive, graduates. Ambition and sensitivity to 
financial incentives help. One of the most popular criteria to rank business schools says it all: 
the average income of graduates after four years. The higher the ranking, the higher the tuition, 
the higher the study debt, the greater the need for a high-paying job, and the greater 
conformity with the model.  
Valuable as the above steps are, the Commission can also take a great leap forward by actively 
promoting the EU Enterprise Model.  
As stressed, the Commission is heavily dependent on the private sector to achieve its 
objectives. It was shown that the present enterprise models are not particularly conducive to 
supporting EU policies. At the same time, the 
Commission has never been in a better position to 
forge change in corporate governance and 
management. A considerable part of the very 
sizeable funds available to the Commission, the 
MFF and NextGenerationEU to support the Green 
Deal, the Digital Economy and the New Industrial 
Strategy, will find its way to the private sector.   
The size of the support of companies and the risks 
involved are such that the Commission can ill 
afford to ignore the flaws of the dominating enterprise models and not to pass judgement on 
corporate performance.  
Decisions on grants and other forms of financial support by the Commission should be guided 
by new and high standards with respect to the positioning of enterprise in society and with 
The Commission is heavily dependent on 
the private sector to achieve its objectives. 
It was shown that the present enterprise 
models are not particularly conducive to 
supporting EU policies. At the same time, 
the Commission has never been in a 
better position to forge change in 
corporate governance and management. 
After Brexit, work can start on a new SE 
truly based on European values, including 
arrangements on co-determination that 
had to be kept separate at the insistence 
of the UK. At the same time, there is now 
an opportunity to design an SE tailor-
made for SMEs. 
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respect to its governance and management, corporate structure, and culture. Financial due 
diligence should be complemented by governance and decision-making due diligence.   
In the case of new Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) the Commission and the EIB are 
participating directly in the definition of the economic and social contribution the PPP should 
make and in the design of the governance and management of the PPP. Pushing collegial 
decision-making contributes to the continuity of the PPP and will help to control individual 
prejudices and biases. Furthermore, they can insist on the management and control of the PPP 
based on cash flows. Simple and transparent as it is, it would help to bridge the cultural divide 
between business and government, and would serve transparency and accountability. 
Requiring that important principles such as fairness and reasonableness are maintained in 
internal dealings and working with partners would underpin the corporate culture of the PPP.  
Who would not like to work for such a company?  
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